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Abstract. On 11 May 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to
participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector
mode: each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the
DM1,000 pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM100, 200,y, 900
(s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most
frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposer–responder pairs were
rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen
participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a
prize of DM500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax or via the internet.
Behavior is described, statistically analyzed and compared to the usual laboratory
ultimatum bargaining results.
JEL classification: C93.
Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; newspaper (or internet) experiment;
fairness; distribution conflicts.
1. INTRODUCTION
The notion of ultimatum bargaining has been introduced in Gu ¨th (1976). The
first experiment with rather moderate pie sizes ranging from DM4 to DM10
has been performed in the winter semester 1977/78 at the University of
Cologne (Gu ¨th et al., 1982). The rules of the game are as follows. If p (40) is
the monetary pie, the proposer can first choose any demand d with pZdZ0
which then the responder can either accept or reject. Acceptance means that
the proposer earns d and the responder p d. In case of a rejection, both earn
nothing. Thus, the demand d is an ultimatum proposal, respectively p d,a
‘take it or leave it’ offer.
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German Economic Review 4(2): 243–265Of the many experimental studies of ultimatum bargaining (for surveys see
Gu ¨th and Tietz, 1990; Gu ¨th, 1995; Roth, 1995) few have used non-student
participants.
1 Newspaper experiments offer the chance to address a large
audience from the general public with a sociological structure different from
laboratory experiments. By inviting readers of the Berliner Zeitung on 11 May
2001 to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment we are able to
provide insights into bargaining behavior and fairness preferences of a much
broader audience than is usually recruited for laboratory experiments. We
especially hypothesize that non-academic participants, as most of the readers
of the Berliner Zeitung are, will generate their behavior more by applying social
norms, e.g. of fairness, rather than by abstract (game-theoretic) rationality
requirements.
Our experiment illustrates how to combine two purposes, namely to
entertain active and passive participants and to interest them in and to
promote research of social interaction. All participants act in both roles, as
active bargainers and as passive social scientists predicting the most frequent
mode of behavior. Our experiment shows that such a type of a prototypical
experiment with a novel design can be explained to a broad (non-academic)
audience and that this may yield new findings, compared to the usual
observations with students, and will also propagate basic insights beyond the
readership of scientific journals (Schmidt, 2001).
Running an experiment on a newspaper platform is, in many respects,
different from the usual laboratory experiments.
2 Typically, participants in
lab experiments are students of age 20 to 25. Newspaper experiments,
however, allow for a variety of subject pools in terms of interest, knowledge or
culture, depending on the particular readership of a newspaper. Even though
the experimenter loses much of the control of the subject pool when running
a newspaper experiment, participants of newspaper experiments can almost
certainly be expected to have a broader range of socio-demographic profiles
than the usual student population. Hence, running experiments in news-
papers offers the chance to test the critical assumption of ‘parallelism’
between the lab and the field. Further, lab experiments seldom last longer
than one or two hours. Participants in a newspaper experiment often have
one or two weeks in which to send in their decisions, thus giving them much
more time to reason about their choice. Finally, rewards for lab participants
are typically about the hourly wage for students, whereas rewards for
newspaper experiments can be much higher in absolute terms, even though
typically not in expected rewards due to the much larger number of
participants in newspaper experiments.
1. For a very recent and striking example see Henrich et al. (2001) who have run ultimatum
games in 15 small-scale societies across the globe, of which three are foraging societies, four
are nomadic herding groups, three sedentary small-scale agriculturalist societies, and six
practice slash-and-burn horticulture.
2. For a thorough discussion of differences between laboratory and newspaper experiments
see Bosch-Dome `nech et al. (2001).
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which resembles decision-making in financial markets, has been conducted
in newspapers (Thaler, 1997; Selten and Nagel, 1998; Bosch-Dome `nech et al.,
2002; Fehr and Renninger, 2000). However, to the best of our knowledge, no
experiments on issues of income distribution, bargaining behavior or fairness
have been conducted in newspapers thus far. Therefore, our study should
serve as a starting point for such kinds of experiments in which we can gather
evidence on a population’s preferences for income distribution, decisions in
bargaining and fairness on a much broader scale.
In Section 2 the experimental procedure is described in more detail. The
large body of decision data by a total of 1,163 participants is described and
also statistically analyzed in Section 3, restricting ourselves to the 1,035
complete decision forms. Section 4 compares the main regularities with those
of the usual ultimatum bargaining experiments, before we conclude in
Section 5.
2. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
In the following we will describe the experimental procedure of the
newspaper experiment, the difficulties that we could observe, the recruited
subject pool and how participants were rewarded.
(i) We contacted a newspaper with a rather diverse readership since we did
not want to substitute students by former students only. Fortunately,
the Berliner Zeitung agreed to participate and also to share the costs of
the experiment.
(ii) We proposed instructions which avoid all the usual terminology and
technicalities and refer to the proposer as Charlotte and to the
responder as Friedrich. The DM1,000 pie is framed as a gift of an
American uncle to his unknown niece Charlotte and nephew Friedrich
who do not know each other in spite of being relatives. The instructions
actually used were then restructured and rewritten by the responsible
journalist (Mangold, 2001; see Appendix A). A decision form was
developed that could be printed in the newspaper (see Appendix B) and
integrated in the internet presence of the Berliner Zeitung (see http://
experiment.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/UG).
(iii) We employed the strategy vector mode which asks each participant to
decide both as a proposer and as a responder by relying on the rather
coarse grid of DM100. More specifically, a participant had to make ten
choices (the demand as a proposer or Charlotte, and nine acceptance
decisions as Friedrich for the offers DM100, 200,y,900).
3
3. By avoiding the demands, respectively offers, DM0 and DM1,000 we do not only exclude
the uninteresting border cases of (monetary) indifference for one party but also make sure
Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet
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participants were asked to predict the most frequent pattern of behavior
again in the form of a strategy vector. Three of the 64 participants, who
actually did predict the most frequent pattern, were rewarded by a
DM500 prize.
(v) Participants could submit decisions by mail, fax or via the internet.
Therefore, two different types of experimental media have been used: on
the one hand, a pen and paper fill-out form by the subjects who
participated by letter post and fax. On the other hand, a computerized
fill-out form which was accessible by a standard web browser via the
internet. For both media types the same decisions had to be made and in
both cases a submission was called complete when a participant stated
his name, address, and his ten choices as well as ten expected, most
frequent choices.
To guarantee some variety participants were not only recruited by the
newspaper announcement in the Berliner Zeitung but also via e-mail to two
different mailing lists. More specifically, we contacted the mailing list of the
virtual experimental laboratory in Berlin with a rather diverse subject pool of
employees and students and the mailing list of Inn-Lab at the University of
Innsbruck which exclusively includes students. The e-mails provided the link
to the site where the experiment could be conducted via the internet. Note
that we refrained from eliciting information about (the level) of education
and demographics since a subject already had to make 20 decisions and
provide its complete address. Therefore, there is no demographic data on the
subject level available. To provide an overview, Table 1 reports the aggregate
characteristics of the three different pools (Berliner Zeitung, German internet,
Austrian internet) from which we recruited participants.
4 Remarkable aspects
are that the non-academic readership of the Berliner Zeitung is (with more
than 61%) much higher than in our mailing lists. Assuming that the
participants by mail and fax have similar characteristics as the group of all
newspaper readers, our attempt not to rely exclusively on academics had been
well placed. Furthermore, readers of the Berliner Zeitung are usually older than
members of the internet mailing lists.
The internet as a marketplace still resembles trade in anarchy
5 since one
often cannot rely on civil law when one party misbehaves. Therefore, it has to
be expected that those who use the internet will feel less obliged by the social
that both players can win something in case of an agreement that seems desirable for a
newspaper experiment.
4. Sources for demographic information at an aggregate level are: Medien Markt Berlin 1/01,
Berliner Verlag GmbH & Co. (Berliner Zeitung); own data (Austrian internet); for the German
internet mailing list there is no aggregate demographic data available. Instead the self-
reported subject characteristics from the participants of Anderhub et al. (2001), which used
the same mailing list, are reported (German internet).
5. See Roth and Ockenfels (2002) or Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) for a discussion of the
trust problem in e-commerce.
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participants are younger on average, this might be partly due to an age effect.
In total we received 1,163 decisions from different persons.
6 In Table 2
it is listed how often the different media (letter post, fax and internet)
were used and how the percentage of usable (complete) decisions were
dependent on the medium. In most cases of incomplete decisions,













20–23 17% 10% 56%
24–27 38% 15%
28–31 18% 5%
32–35 17% 16% 1%
435 65% 10% 1%
Education
9 years of schooling
21%
4% 0%
10 years of schooling 10% 0%
12–13 years of schooling 40% 40% 96%
Master’s degree 38% 4%
Ph.D. 39% 8% 0%





Other academic field 54% 21%
Other non-academic 61% 18% 1%
aSource: Medien Markt Berlin 1/01, Berliner Verlag GmbH & Co. The Berliner Zeitung has about
400,000 daily readers.
bGerman internet participants were recruited via the mailing list of the virtual experimental
laboratory at Humboldt University Berlin, which included about 850 e-mail addresses in May
2001. For the German internet mailing list we do not have data on aggregate demographics;
instead the self-reported subject characteristics of the participants of Anderhub et al. (2001) are
reported, which used the same mailing list (German internet).
cAustrian internet participants were recruited via the mailing list of Inn-Lab at the University of
Innsbruck, which included about 500 e-mail addresses in May 2001.
6. In order to avoid multiple participation of single persons, we checked the names of all
participants and dropped three submissions which were handed in twice. Joint participa-
tion of persons living at the same address has been observed a couple of times. It is,
however, noteworthy that decision sheets have been identical in such cases only very
seldom.
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proposer.
7 In total, 47 (22%) letters and 17 (13%) faxes were only partly
filled out.
8 Participants in the internet had to navigate through four
consecutive pages. The first page replicated the newspaper article (see
Appendix A). The second (third) page requested actual and expected decisions
as Charlotte (Friedrich). On the fourth page, participants had to fill in their
name and address. Internet participants could only move on to the next page
if all information required on the previous page was fully provided. Sixty-four
internet participants (8%) did not finish, by dropping out of the experiment
before submitting the information of the fourth page. Aggregating fax and
letter submissions as pen and paper, we find that the frequency of incomplete
decisions is significantly larger with pen and paper than with the internet
(w
2 527.6, df51; po0.01).
The participants who were randomly chosen for payment and an overview
of the results were published in the Berliner Zeitung two weeks after the initial
announcement (Schmidt, 2001). The monetary rewards were as follows:
  Of the three chosen pairs, all reached an agreement with all proposers
demanding DM500 and all responders accepting this offer.
  The most frequent mode of behavior was to demand DM500 as a proposer
and to accept all offers as a responder. This was predicted by 64 (6%) of all
participants. Three of them were randomly selected and received the
prediction prize of DM500.
3. RESULTS
First, the large data set – compared to laboratory experiments – is analyzed on
the aggregate level. Second, we consider the different types of media which
Table 2 Frequencies of participation by different media
Medium Letter Fax Internet All
Submissions 216 132 815 1,163
Incomplete 47 17 – 64
Unfinished – – 64 64
Usable 169 115 751 1,035
7. Rather than attributing this kind of behavior to a false consensus (‘Others will choose the
same demand and thus offer the same amount!’) we rather think that this expresses
forward-induction thinking (‘The obvious result is that the proposer asks for half the pie
which, of course, will be accepted; so there is no need to engage in counterfactual
considerations for the other offers!’).
8. We did not count forms that could not be received because of transmission errors. In four
cases a fax was illegible. Transmission errors via letter post and internet could not be
controlled for by the experimenters.
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Third, we check whether there are differences in behavior with respect to the
geographic origin of the participants. For the analysis we rely on the 1,035
complete decision forms only.
3.1. Aggregate results
Table 3 summarizes the actual and expected demands as Charlotte. Both,
actual and expected demands, are double peaked with a somewhat surprising
minor peak at the greediest demand of DM900.
9 One-half of all actual
demands are DM500 and thus proposing to split the pie equally. The second
most frequent demand is DM600 (22.4%). The game-theoretic benchmark
when payoffs are given by own monetary rewards, namely the highest
possible amount of DM900, is chosen by 113 participants (10.9%). The
arithmetic average of all demands is DM589.6.
Expected demands are on average DM588.1, which is similar to actual
demands. There is no significant difference of both cumulative distributions
(p40.2; Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). A notable difference to actual demands
is the fact that considerably fewer subjects (6.6%) expect most others to
actually demand the maximum amount (10.9%). Figure 1 plots the relative
frequencies of the difference between a subject’s own demand as Charlotte
and her expected demand. Note, a negative sign indicates expecting others to
demand more than oneself. Zero difference is the most frequent behavior
(49.9%). The difference ranges between þ 100 and –100 for 80% of the
subjects. The rest of the decisions are distributed almost equally on both tails.




(relative frequency in %)
Expected demands










Average demand (N51,035) 589.57 588.12
9. Strictly speaking, actual demands have a third peak at the demand of DM100, which is
more frequent (0.6%) than the demand of DM200.
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one-quarter consider themselves as more, respectively less, modest.
Turning to behavior in the role of Friedrich, Table 4 reports the relative
frequencies of actually accepting a certain offer as well as of expecting others
to accept. When an equal split is proposed, participants accept the offer most
often (98.1%). The lowest offer of DM100 is accepted in 34.9% of the cases.
Although only one-third of the subjects behave fully rational with respect to
monetary payoffs, this share is much higher than in usual ultimatum
experiments, as will be discussed in Section 4.
Note that the frequency of accepting offers declines monotonically from
the peak at DM500 when offers get larger. This result is driven by what we call
non-monotonic strategies. Non-monotonic response behavior is by no means
irrational. It indicates a strong aversion against more or less biased reward
allocations. Whereas rejection of too low offers can be justified by the
argument that it costs little to punish, rejection of too high offers implies an
even larger sacrifice of the responder than for the proposer. A monotonic
strategy is characterized by accepting all offers above a certain minimum
acceptance level minZ100. In the role of Friedrich, 90.6% of the subjects
have monotonic strategies. The rest have two kinds of non-monotonic


























Difference between own demand as Charlotte and expected demand
Charlotte
Figure 1 Relative frequency of difference between own demand as Charlotte and
expected demand
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10 Another 47
subjects accept two or more offers in an intermediate range, rejecting all
offers below a minimum and above a maximum (with maxo900). Only three
subjects switched more than once from accepting to rejecting such as
accepting the offers of DM100, 300 and 500 to 700.
Figure 2 shows the difference between the actual frequencies of accepting
and the expected frequency for given offers. A positive sign indicates that
subjects actually accept more often than they expect others to accept. This is
the case for offers from DM100 to 500 which subjects accept more often than
they expect others to do. Hence, subjects expect others to care less for money
and more for equality than they do themselves (the frequency distributions of
actual and expected decisions as Friedrich are significantly different for offers
ranging from DM100 to DM400; w
2410 for each offer, df51; po0.01).
3.2. Differences in media type
For the following analysis we pool the fax and letter submissions
11 and
compare them to internet submissions. This allows us to check whether
participants using pen and paper behave differently from those using the
computerized version. Our data set of complete decision forms consists of 284
(27.5%) letter/fax forms and 751 (72.5%) forms submitted via the internet.
Table 5 reports actual and expected demands as Charlotte for both types of
media. On average, internet participants demand DM604.3, which is 9.7%
more than letter/fax participants with an average demand of only DM550.7.




(relative frequency in %)
Expected acceptance rates










10. Our guess is that most incomplete decision forms actually are aiming at non-monotonic
response behavior in the sense that unanswered offers are viewed as unacceptable.
11. We tested for differences in averages or in the distribution of values between fax and letter
submissions but found none. Therefore, we decided to group the data by letter/fax and
internet in the following.
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internet participants do so. Very remarkable is the share of 13.6% of internet






























































































Figure 2 Differences between actual and expected frequency of accepting an offer as
Friedrich
Table 5 Actual and expected demands of proposer (Charlotte) by medium
Actual demands
(relative frequency in %)
Expected demands
(relative frequency in %)
Own demand (in DM) Letter/Fax Internet Letter/Fax Internet
100 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.1
200 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
300 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7
400 2.5 2.8 0.7 2.3
500 64.1 44.7 54.2 47.1
600 20.8 23.0 26.8 20.4
700 7.0 9.9 10.6 18.0
800 1.4 4.7 2.8 4.1
900 3.9 13.6 4.6 7.3
Average demand 550.70 604.26 572.89 593.87
(N5284) (N5751) (N5284) (N5751)
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Charlotte are significantly different between both types of media both with
regards to mean values (po0.01, U-test
12) as well as with regards to the
distribution of demands (po0.01, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test).
Expected demands in the role of Charlotte also differ between both types of
media (po0.05, U-test). However, the differences are not as pronounced as
observed in actual demands. Internet (letter/fax) participants expect, on
average, a demand of DM593.9 (572.9) and 47.1% (54.2%) of subjects expect
others to demand DM500 in the role of Charlotte. Compared with their
actual demands (DM604), internet participants expect others to demand a
lower share (DM594), meaning that internet participants often view others as
being relatively more equity oriented.
In the role of the responder (Friedrich) subjects accept the equal split most
often, i.e. in 98.9% of the letter/fax submissions and 97.7% of the internet
submissions, respectively. Yet, the equal split is the only offer in which the
relative frequency of accepting is higher in letter/fax submissions than
internet submissions, as can be seen in Table 6. A remarkable 39% of inter-
net participants accept the smallest possible offer of DM100; only 23.9%
of fax and letter participants do so. Relative acceptance rises monoto-
nically until the equal split and falls again thereafter. Whereas in the
internet acceptance levels stay above 93% for offers larger than DM500,
they decrease monotonically to 82% for an offer of DM900 in faxes and
letters owing to non-monotonic response behavior. With the exception of the
equal split, internet participants accept each possible offer significantly more
often than letter/fax participants (w
2-test for each offer separately, df51;
po0.01).
The results on expected behavior as Friedrich mirror actual behavior as can
be judged from Table 6. With the exception of DM500 offers, expectations on
acceptance levels are significantly different between both types of media (w
2-
test for each offer separately, df51; po0.01). Both letter/fax and internet
participants expect others to accept less often than they actually do up to an
amount of DM500. Hence, with relatively low offers participants think that
others care, on average, less for money and reject the (relatively low) amount
more often. The reverse is true for offers starting from DM600, although the
difference between actual and expected behavior is, by far, less pronounced in
this range of offers than for offers from DM100 to 400.
In the following, we will examine whether responders in the role of
Friedrich differ also with respect to chosen strategies. Remember, we call a
strategy monotonic if a responder accepts all offers above a certain minimum
acceptance level minZ100. Most of the internet participants (93.9%) but
only 82.0% of letter/fax participants can be classified as having a monotonic
strategy in the role of responder (w
2 533.9, df51; po0.01). A similar result
holds for the expected strategies: letter/fax participants expect the strategies
12. Owing to the discreteness of our variable we do not apply a parametric t-test.
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(w
2 515.4, df51; po0.01).
Furthermore, we compare the differences of the own demand as Charlotte
and the expectations about the most frequent demand of other participants.
Subjects with a negative (positive) difference expect others to be meaner
(more generous). Figure 3 shows the relative frequencies of differences.
Interestingly, the relatively more game-theoretic ‘rational’ internet partici-
pants (judged by their higher demands and their higher frequency of
accepting low offers) expect others more often to be more generous than
themselves (27.0%) than letter/fax participants do (15.5%). Letter/fax
participants, on the contrary, tend to expect more often others to be meaner
than internet participants do (32.0% vs. 24.1%). This altogether indicates
that internet participants expect and accept to (be) exploit(ed) whereas pen-
and-paper participants resent exploitation more strongly. There is thus more
fairness in the mail and more opportunism in the internet.
Participants with monotonic strategies as Friedrich can be classified
according to the sum of the own demand d as Charlotte and the minimum
acceptance level ‘min’ as Friedrich. We distinguish three types:
  the careful ones where d þ mino1,000;
  the dogmatic ones where d þ min51,000; and
  the greedy ones where d þ min41,000.
Table 7 summarizes the relative frequency of different types in both media. In
the internet we find 5 percentage points more greedy types. In fact, the
distribution of types as classified by the sum of own demand and minimum
acceptance level is significantly different between both media (w
2 57.99,
df52; po0.05).
Table 6 Actual and expected decisions as responder (Friedrich) by medium
Actual acceptance rates
(relative frequency in %)
Expected acceptance rates
(relative frequency in %)
Offer of (DM) Letter/Fax Internet Letter/Fax Internet
100 23.9 39.0 12.3 19.2
200 27.8 45.7 17.6 25.4
300 44.0 61.9 41.9 51.4
400 73.9 81.2 68.3 74.2
500 98.9 97.7 97.2 97.2
600 90.1 95.9 90.5 95.9
700 85.9 95.1 89.4 95.7
800 83.5 93.5 88.0 94.5
900 82.0 93.9 87.0 94.3
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of internet participants appears to be more opportunistic,
13 whereas behavior
of letter/fax participants seems fairer. These differences can either be
attributed to the type of medium or to differences in the subject pool.
3.3. Differences in geographic origin
Since we have observed different patterns of behavior in both types of media
we separate our data into letter/fax and internet participants and check
whether geographic origin of participants in the respective medium plays a
role. Postal codes were used to separate faxes and letters, respectively internet
submissions, into the following geographical ‘categories’. We attributed ‘East’
for participants who live in the ‘Neue Bundesla ¨nder’ and East Berlin, and
‘West’ for subjects who live in the ‘Alte Bundesla ¨nder’ and West Berlin.
14 By



























Difference between own demand as Charlotte and expected demand
letter/fax
internet
Figure 3 Own demand minus expected demand: letter/fax versus internet
13. In Section 4 below it will be shown that demanding DM500 is opportunistic, too, in the
sense of maximizing one’s own expected payoff given that expectations are consistent with
actual response behavior.
14. Of course, we cannot control whether participants with an address in the ‘West’ were
brought up in the ‘East’ or vice versa. Note, however, that the Berliner Zeitung has a large
majority of readers from the former ‘East’.
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383 from the East and 168 from the West.
3.3.1. Letter and fax submissions
When we compare the East and West subjects, who participated via letter/fax,
most of the decision variables do not differ significantly. In the role of
Charlotte East residents demand, on average, DM550, participants living in the
West DM552. There are some marginal differences in their behavior as
Friedrich: all 192 East participants accept the equal split whereas ‘only’ 96.7%
of West participants do. East participants accept low offers less often (the effect
is, however, only significant for an offer of DM400). Altogether, the group of
participants who responded via letter and fax seems to be quite homogeneous
in their decisions, irrespective whether they live in the East or in the West.
3.3.2. Internet submissions
With regards to the internet participants the previous result is, basically,
replicated: behavior of participants living either in the East or the West of
Germany does not differ significantly. Because we recruited German internet
participants mainly from the mailing list of the virtual experimental
laboratory in Berlin this led to a rather homogeneous subject pool of former
participants of experiments that consists to a large extent, yet not exclusively,
of students. We conclude from this that the major difference in the subject
pool is the medium
15 by which one participates and not the geographical
origin as far as German participants are concerned.
In a next step we will compare this group of German internet participants
as a whole to the Austrian internet participants. As is evident from Table 1,
Austrian internet participants are drawn from a mailing list containing
exclusively students, with almost 80% of them studying either economics or
business administration. Table 8 splits proposer and responder behavior of
internet participants by nationality. Austrian participants demand on average
about 3% more than their German counterparts as Charlotte (DM618.5 vs.
Table 7 Types and medium
Relative frequency (in %)
Type sum d þ min letter/fax (N5233) Internet (N5705)
Careful o1,000 60.9 58.9
Dogmatic 51,000 36.5 33.3
Greedy 41,000 2.6 7.8
15. Although readers of the Berliner Zeitung could also rely on the internet, the other
participants were purely approached by using electronic mailing lists. Thus the medium of
participation could also reflect different compositions of subject pools.
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role (DM620 vs. DM584.4; po0.01, U-test). The difference in demands between
Austrians and Germans is mainly driven by the considerably lower fraction of
Austrians proposing the equal split (35.5% vs. 48.1%). Austrians are signifi-
cantly more often willing to accept offers above DM500 (po0.05 in any case;
w
2-test). Furthermore, Austrians more often rely on monotonic strategies as
Friedrich than Germans (97.0% vs. 92.7%; w
2 54.6, df51; po0.05).
Given the differences between Austrian and German internet participants,
we have to check the robustness of the results of the previous subsections
on differences by media type, because the observed differences might have
been caused by pooling Austrian and German internet participants versus
Table 8 Internet participants and nationality
(a) Demands of proposer (Charlotte)
Actual demands
(relative frequency in %)
Expected demands
(relative frequency in %)
Own demand (in DM) Germany Austria Germany Austria
100 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.0
200 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
300 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.5
400 2.7 3.0 2.0 3.0
500 48.1 35.5 51.4 35.5
600 21.1 28.5 19.2 23.5
700 10.3 8.5 16.7 21.5
800 3.4 8.0 3.3 6.5
900 13.2 14.5 6.5 9.5
Average demand 599.09 618.50 584.39 620.00
(N5551) (N5200) (N5551) (N5200)
(b) Decisions as responder (Friedrich)
Actual acceptance rates
(relative frequency in %)
Expected acceptance rates
(relative frequency in %)
Offer of (DM) Germany Austria Germany Austria
100 38.5 40.5 19.8 17.5
200 44.3 49.5 24.9 27.0
300 60.6 65.5 51.4 51.5
400 79.9 85.0 75.0 72.0
500 97.3 99.0 96.6 99.0
600 94.6 99.5 94.7 99.0
700 93.8 98.5 94.7 98.5
800 92.0 97.5 93.5 97.5
900 92.7 97.0 93.5 96.5
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pen-and-paper submissions with German internet participants.
16 As it turns
out, behavior still differs considerably between users of different media types.
Whereas letter/fax participants demand as Charlotte on average DM550.7,
German internet participants demand DM599.1 (po0.01, U-test). Expected
demands are no longer significantly different (DM572.9 vs. DM584.4 for
letter/fax and internet, respectively). Regarding responder behavior as
Friedrich, the relative frequency of accepting a given offer is significantly
larger for German users of the internet than users of fax or letter in all cases
except the equal split (w
2-test for each offer separately, df51; po0.05).
German internet participants have also more monotonic strategies (92.7%)
than letter/fax participants (82.0%, w
2 522.1, df51; po0.01), and the
distribution of careful, dogmatic or greedy types is different between both
media (w
2 58.9, df52; po0.05), with 7.9% greedy, 30.5% dogmatic and
61.6% careful types in the German internet.
4. COMPARISON WITH OTHER ULTIMATUM EXPERIMENTS
One of the most surprising results of our study is the fact that acceptance of
all offers is the mode of responder behavior and that 34.9% of participants are
willing to accept the lowest possible offer of DM100, which is only 10% of the
distributable pie. Since most ultimatum experiments do not employ the
strategy (vector) method the evidence to test responses to lowest offers is
limited. The results reported in Slonim and Roth (1998), who used a repeated
ultimatum game but not the strategy method, indicate that even with high
stakes
17 the frequency of rejecting offers of about 10% of the pie is around
90%.
18 In other words, an offer of 10% of the pie is accepted only in about
10% of cases, whereas our newspaper readers are willing to accept the lowest
offer of DM100 approximately in every third case.
Of course, it is more appropriate to compare our newspaper results with
ultimatum-game experiments which used the strategy method. In a study on
the influence of physical attractiveness and gender on one-shot ultimatum-
game decisions, Schweitzer and Solnick (1999) asked 70 responders to
16. Note from Table 1 that the two subject pools, readers of the Berliner Zeitung and the German
internet mailing list, are both diverse with respect to education when compared to the
Austrian internet mailing list. Still, the readers of the Berliner Zeitung have a much higher
portion of non-academic readers compared to the German internet participants.
17. Experiments were conducted in the Slovak Republic. The middle and high stakes were
approximately equivalent to a student’s earnings from one day (middle stakes) or one week
(high stakes) of work. For an extensive review on the influence of financial incentives on
behavior in experiments see Camerer and Hogarth (1999, Table 1).
18. See their logit regressions of rejection probabilities dependent on the proportion of the pie
offered in Figure 2 (Slonim and Roth, 1998, p. 582). As can be calculated from the data in
their appendix, offers below 20% of the pie were rejected in 10 out of 11 cases in the middle
stakes treatment, respectively in 4 out of 5 cases in the high stakes treatment.
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19 Only four out
of 70 subjects (5.7%) stated a minimum acceptable offer of h1 or less. This
fraction of accepting very low offers is clearly smaller than in our newspaper
study. However, in another study of Solnick (2001), she found that 26 out of
89 (27%) subjects were willing to accept an offer of h1 or less out of a pie of
h10. Though this acceptance rate does not differ significantly from
acceptance rates in our whole data set (with N51,035), it is still smaller
than acceptance rates (of 39%) in our subpopulation of internet participants
(w
2 53.24; po0.05, one-sided test). In a recent study by Gu ¨th and Kovacs
(2001), where the responders of a modified ultimatum game had to bid for
the degree of veto power,
20 20 out of 80 subjects (25%) are willing to accept
10% or less of the pie in the standard ultimatum-game condition. Also, this
share of acceptances is significantly smaller than the acceptance rates of the
lowest DM100 offer in our experiment (w
2 53.22; po0.05, one-sided test).
One might argue that the higher acceptance rates of meager offers in our
newspaper experiment are driven by the higher stakes, implying that even
though absolute acceptance thresholds increase with pie sizes, relative
acceptance thresholds, i.e. acceptance thresholds divided by pie sizes, go
down when pies become large. The evidence from Hoffman et al. (1996) and
Slonim and Roth (1998) suggest that rejection rates go down when the pie
increases to high stakes. However, when considering expected payoffs, the
ex-post expected payoff for our newspaper readers was at best DM3 (about
h1.5), which is below the expected payoffs of lab participants in Schweitzer
and Solnick (1999), Solnick (2001), or Gu ¨th and Kovacs (2001). Hence, we
arrive at our Observation 1.
Observation 1. Compared to usual ultimatum bargaining experiments the
willingness to accept unfair offers, e.g. of only 10% shares, is surprisingly
high, especially for participants using the internet.
Since offers larger than DM500 are accepted slightly less often than the fair
offer of DM500, only offers in the range from DM100 to 500 are candidates for
maximizing expected proposer gains when assuming rational expectations. In
Figure 4 we have plotted the expected proposer profits for all such offers,
separating letter/fax and internet participants. The expected profit-maximizing
offer is DM500 in both cases. The unprofitability of meager offers is, however,
19. Note that asking for minimum acceptable offers restricts responders’ choices to monotonic
strategies, which may be at odds with subjects’ preferences. See our results on non-
monotonic strategies in Section 3.1.
20. There were four different degrees of veto power. With no veto power at all, the dictator
game was played. The highest veto power led to the standard ultimatum game, where the
responder’s rejection leads to both players receiving nothing. The intermediate degrees of
veto power created a linear combination of ultimatum and dictator game. With l ¼ 1
3 ð2
3Þ,a
rejection led to 1
3 ð2
3Þ of the pie being distributed according to the proposer’s offer (of relative
shares).
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r Verein fu ¨r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003 259less striking for internet participants than for those who rely on pen and
paper.
21 In our newspaper experiment, offering the equal split maximizes
expected earnings, as has also been found for many laboratory ultimatum
experiments (see the survey of Roth, 1995). This confirms that the striking
result of laboratory ultimatum experiments is not proposer fairness (Harrison
and McCabe, 1996), but that responders reject substantial offers.
Observation 2. The modal behavior of offering DM500 and accepting all
offers is consistent with maximizing own expected profits, given the actually
observed behavior. Offering an equal split maximizes expected profits, as has
also been found in many ultimatum games in the laboratory.
Another remarkable result is the 9% proportion of non-monotonic response
behavior (see also Gu ¨th and Huck, 1997, who unfortunately used a biased
elicitation method), which cannot be observed with the sequential game-
playing method and the monotonic strategy method asking for minimally












































Figure 4 Expected profits of offers DM100 to 500 separated by letter/fax and
internet
21. When including incomplete decisions (assuming that offers to which one did not react at
all are rejected) the optimality of equal splits when only confronting pen-and-paper
participants is even more striking.
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acceptance thresholds only.
If one is strictly inequality averse, rejection of extremely generous offers
larger than DM500 is as natural as (but far more costly than) the rejection of
too low offers. Rejecting high offers means that the responder sacrifices more
than the proposer does. Participants who refuse too low and too high offers
apparently insist quite strongly on fair outcomes.
Observation 3. Insisting on fair outcomes is the main motivation of 9% of
all participants to apply non-monotonic response strategies. This behavior is
more frequently observed when relying on mail or fax than for internet
participants.
5. CONCLUSION
Previous newspaper experiments (of which we are aware) have exclusively
relied on the guessing game, which is taken as a vehicle to study decision-
making in financial markets. Compared to this we have used the ultimatum
game to address a large public, the readers of Berliner Zeitung, with issues of
fairness, opportunism, bargaining and income distribution. The ultimatum
game is a simple two-player game which has been predominantly studied
with student populations. Our paper has demonstrated that one can explore
such bargaining situations in the form of newspaper experiments, and that a
large share of non-academic readership is no obstacle.
We have found new and surprising results, e.g. that acceptance of all, even
meager, offers is the modal response behavior. Furthermore, we have noticed
that the medium by which participants submit their decisions is an important
signal: internetters appear as more greedy and opportunistic than participants
relying on letter or fax which, of course, might simply mirror an average age
discrepancy. Unfortunately, we have no data on age or education of our
participants. Gathering more socio-demographic data of participants in
newspaper experiment, thus, seems to be a promising avenue for future
research into the parallelism of the lab and the field. Our study may serve as a
starting point for such kinds of experiments in which one can gather
evidence on a much broader population’s preferences for income distribu-
tion, decisions in bargaining, or fairness.
APPENDIX A: TRANSLATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
The 1,000 DM prize game
How would you decide?
Looking into any standard textbook of economic science from past decades,
one will come across an assertion that experiments are impossible in
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r Verein fu ¨r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003 261economic science. In the meantime, this has changed. For example, at the
Humboldt University, where experiments have been conducted for a long
time by the Institute of Economic Theory III (chair of Werner Gu ¨th). These
are either carried out as laboratory tests with specifically invited students or
arranged as prize-winning games for a broader public group via a newspaper.
Today we would like to introduce the 1,000 DM Prize Game which is staged
by this Institute in cooperation with Berliner Zeitung. You are invited to take
part in it. On 25 May the prize winners will be announced under this headline
with a background report interpreting the results of this experiment.
The game is based on an intuitive setup: an uncle in America has a niece
and a nephew in Germany named Charlotte and Friedrich respectively. They
are related to, but do not know, each other. Their uncle has decided to donate
a total of 1,000 DM to these two. He has, however, linked this charitable gift
to the condition that Charlotte makes an initial proposal regarding how
much of that 1,000 DM sum she would like to keep for herself and how much
she intends to leave for Friedrich. Should Friedrich agree with Charlotte’s
proposal, their uncle will promptly credit the corresponding amounts to their
accounts. If Friedrich, however, declines Charlotte’s proposal, neither of them
will receive anything. One example: if Charlotte assigns 700 DM to herself,
and 300 to Friedrich, Friedrich can still cash in 300 DM. On the other hand, if
he rejects this proposal, both are going to end up with nothing. If you join
and are lucky in the game, you, dear reader, may be picked for the role of
Charlotte or that of Friedrich. We shall select six participants (male and
female) who will be grouped into three pairs in a random procedure without
consideration of sex. These three pairs will then be paid out as decreed by ‘the
uncle’. This means that money will only be awarded to the participants if a
pair agrees on Charlotte’s proposal.
Regardless of that, you have another chance of winning, provided you are
good in forecasting. What you are required to do is predict the typical
behavior of the participants as accurately as possible. Of all mails received
with a correct forecast, three will be drawn and each awarded a prize of 500
DM. All in all, we shall distribute up to 4,500 DM. Each (he or she) participant
will be faced with decision-making in both roles, i.e. that of Charlotte and of
Friedrich, since roles are randomly allocated. You should enter your decision
in the left column of your newspaper decision form. The remaining amount
would go to Friedrich. When acting as Friedrich, all you need to do is to cross-
mark which of Charlotte’s offers you want to accept or reject. You can mark
your guesses about the typical behavior of all participants in the roles of
Charlotte and Friedrich in the right-hand column of that same form.
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Newspaper decision form
Your decision as Charlotte. How much will most of the other participants
demand for themselves in the role of Acting as Charlotte I
demand for me DM....... C h a rlotte? DM ........................
(Please enter only one of the nine possible demands in the left and right






How will most of the
other participants decide
in the role of Friedrich?
100 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
200 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
300 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
400 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
500 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
600 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
700 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
800 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
900 DM (i.e. Charlotte
keeps 900 DM)
accept/reject accept/reject
(Cross ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ in the left and right column in all nine lines)
Sender’s address
Name
Street Postal code Place
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